Post by Sunday at midnight
Since Blogger.com has stopped allowing unlimited comment space, change one thing about your blog post: instead of pasting your article after your own comments, just past a small portion (if possible) and a link now. Thanks.
I post two different attitudes toward Korean culture and commodities.
1 of 2. Here's the article by Dr. Jon Huer that made me (and many others) pretty angry at his shallow analysis.
2 of 2. Here's my follow up that the Korea Times said would be published there soon.
It's 'sociologist vs. sociologist' ;-)
1 of 2:
Dr. Huer:
05-01-2009 17:44
Would Kimchi Be Korea’s Fame?
By Jon Huer
Korea Times Columnist
There are many Asian nations that have contributed to one part or another of the world vocabulary. There are the "Manila envelope," the "Chinese fire drill," the "Japanese maple," the "Indian paper," and so on.
Is there such a contribution that Korea can claim? What would be something that the world can connect to Korea? Is there anything that can be considered Korea's unique contribution to the world?
Those who are familiar with Korea would be almost unanimous in mentioning that unique Korean concoction called "Kimchi." In their minds, Kimchi and Korea are inseparable.
In many ways, Kimchi is Korea, both in the dietary sense and in the metaphorical sense. Sociologically speaking, Kimchi is everything Korea is, and vice versa, as Korea's social character can be defined by it easily and accurately. Kimchi is Korea's soul, self-image, and identifier.
Kimchi and Korea are a match made in Heaven. They are so intricately intertwined that one cannot legitimately exist without the other. Both are highly original in quality, odd and strange in substance and strong and indelible in aftertaste.
Korea without Kimchi is like a flock without its shepherd, a Catholic congregation without its priest, soldiers without their commander, children without their parents or guardians, or a bee colony without its queen bee.
Kimchi without Korea as its home, on the other hand, is like a migratory flock of birds without their homing device, completely lost and misplaced, as we cannot imagine any other culture in the world that would be so perfectly fit for Kimchi as Korea is.
Kimchi is Korea's culinary temple, its shroud of mystery and oracle, and all that is necessary and logical in Korean life. A Korean meal without Kimchi is like the arctic without its icecaps, Mt. Everest without its heigh and the Sahara without its sand. In other words, it makes all things right in Korea.
Separating Kimchi from Korea is like taking leather away from the cobbler, the voice from the singer, water from the stream or waves from the ocean. For a Korean, to be deprived of Kimchi is almost as traumatic as Adam and Eve to be kicked out of the Garden of Eden.
What is this concoction called Kimchi that has such a powerful hold over Korea and its spiritual imagination, and by which the world knows about Korea?
Kimchi is definitely an acquired taste. Its whole makeup ― visual, olfactory, taste ― is so odd and alien to visitors here that a foreigner's love for Korea is often determined by whether he can handle this perniciously smelling but incredibly addictive dish that is ubiquitous on all Korean food tables.
Kimchi is mainly made up of Chinese cabbage fermented with all sorts of spices, among them a good portion of hot peppers, garlic, fish juice and ginger, depending on each household's formula and tradition. Nutritionally speaking, that Kimchi is good for one's health is undisputed. Koreans are so dependent on this dish that no Korean considers his meal complete unless Kimchi is also served.
Let's admit it: Kimchi is one of the greatest wonders of the culinary world. Once addicted to it, no one can escape its orbit. Long-term foreign residents of Korea normally measure their degree of "Koreanization" by it.
A novice finds it revolting; an intermediate resident finds it interesting, something to try out; a successful transplant is aroused to a great appetite whenever he smells Kimchi. Naturally, for most visitors to Korea, its smell, taste, and texture require considerable understanding of anthropology and sociology in order to tolerate.
To most foreigners, Kimchi is just too spicy, too pungent, and too hot, almost like Korean culture itself, to make it a routine part of their daily menu. Like caviar, Kimchi is definitely an acquired taste.
But unfortunately for Kimchi and for Korea, Kimchi is not considered a high-image culinary experience. Caviar is connected to the image of high living, champagne and exotic romance, even though it's definitely an acquired taste. We think about adventures, faraway vacations and the sweet smell of success when we think about caviar. As for Kimchi, romance is the last thing we associate with it. Even in most Korean movies, lovers never eat Kimchi for dinner if kissing and romancing is to follow their dinner scene. For romance afterward, the movie lovers eat at a Western-style restaurant.
Unlike caviar, Kimchi has not attained its world fame yet, and I am not sure if it ever will. The trouble is not necessarily with Kimchi itself; it is with Korean cuisine. Unlike Chinese, Thai or Japanese cuisines, Korean food is still too spicy, too pungent and too hot to be favored on the world stage.
To be successful on the world stage, cuisine requires a certain level of bland superficiality that the average human taste bud can readily accept. Chinese food, Thai dishes, and Japanese sushi have the virtue of this bland superficiality. The only time Kimchi became popular among the Chinese, for example, was when the severe acute deficiency syndrome (SARS) epidemic was threatening; the Chinese ate it as a medicine to repel the syndrome.
Korean cuisine, in particular Korean Kimchi, is very much like Korean people or Korean culture: First we are repelled by its offensiveness, but later become captivated by its addictive quality that won't leave you alone once you truly acquire the taste. For Koreans who leave Korea and Korean culture, Kimchi is the last thing that departs them in their de-Koreanization process.
For an average Korean, it takes almost a heroic effort and epic struggle, like a drug addict who wants to kick the habit, to shake off the Kimchi-addiction if he wishes to escape the Korean orbit. Kimchi is the ultimate litmus test for those who come to Korea as well as for those who leave Korea: Adjusting to it is a sign of successful Koreanization; being able to leave it a sign of complete de-Koreanization.
Korea is known throughout the world for its technological wonders. Kimchi, a strange but powerful native product of Korea, wants to share that fame.
The writer can be reached at jonhuer@hotmail.com. The opinions expressed and the observations described in these articles are strictly the writer's own and do not represent any official position of the University of Maryland University College or the USFK.
[All of Dr. Huer's style reads like this: like a guy taunting you at a bar to fight him, repeating himself, over and over, and, NO DATA.]
http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/05/272_44192.html
[See others reactions to him with the comments at the link, click the area for more comments, etc.]
2 of 2.
The Koreanness of Food: The Missing Ingredient for Selling Korean Food Abroad Is Selling Context, Not Masking It
The recent decision to encourage selling Korean food abroad by state financing involves “36 food experts, officials, and CEOs including Agriculture Minister Chang and Culture Minister Yu.” Quite a banquet. Let’s hope they think that selling food is more than quantitative. Perhaps an environmental sociologist, like me, studying consumption comparatively for many years and now living in Korea, can provide suggestions for what may translate overseas qualitatively as well.
First, it seems many assume selling food is just a quantitative experience of gross sales. Another Korean Times columnist recently discussed “the selling of kimchi” and recommended it be divorced from all context as if it were some sort of stand-alone commodity that requires masking Korean culture to sell. Completely opposite is my view on this. Let’s hope government money is not wasted on such ‘dumbed down’ views of Korea because I think it would be self-destructive of the type of ‘brand’ that Korea wants to project with sales of Korean food. On the contrary, instead of masking Korea as you sell its food, what would make a successful policy is the selling of a special Korean food experience, organization, and feeling instead of just deculturalized ‘dead commodities.’
The symbolism and atmosphere in which Korean food is consumed is what is Korean. Tastes are not your problem in selling Korean food. The unvoiced issue is that Korean food has its own infrastructure of cooking and serving that is profoundly cultural. There are at least three unique arrangements: the hot pots you serve in their own holders that are safe(r), the shared table grilling environment (set in chair-based tables or set in low tables for floor seating), and shared mixed platters of combined food for you to experiment with how to merge them, or how to share it among friends with separate apchopshi dishes served ‘blank’ in front of you.
I think Korean food would go over well to have restaurants organized around these infrastructural items, similar to how hibachi Japanese became international while the food was only part of the whole 'experience'. Sell the event and merged table/kitchen feel, and I think it would work. Choose food that translates best to these three kinds of kitchen/table merged restaurant.
I've been to 'Korean' restaurants in the USA that lacked merged kitchen/table options. 'Korean food' on Western plates was missing something. Sell whole merged kitchen/table atmosphere of foods and floor seating options while having chairs as well for a consumer’s choice. Make the ondol as inviting as it already is. Build ondol into the restaurants. I’ve read the Korean government is attempting to popularize ondol internationally. Popularize ondol in Korean restaurants as the best route to give it a positive symbolism overseas.
On the tables, leave it to the consumer to spice their food with Korean choices to experiment, to try different kimchi's, to get free refills on vegetable side dishes, and perhaps to have free shigye (sweet rice drink) for dessert. By all means serve ‘hongi-pap’ (one metal box/serving of hot rice) instead of a lump of cooling rice on a plate. Give everyone a big Korean spoon for rice instead of only metal chopsticks. And of course the shikye should be served ice-cold in ever-present Korean metal cups. Perhaps ‘hangul’ calligraphy on wallpaper or cups could have Korean phrases with translations to encourage having fun with a different language, culture, and sound.
Korea has an astounding regional variety of foods. Perhaps government-aided restaurants should survey different regions and pick items from each. Perhaps North Korea’s preserved and popularized royal cuisine (little eaten in South Korea) might have a few items—encouraging fellow feeling of ‘greater Korea’ abroad as well as at home.
All jeong varieties can be sold as "Korean pizza." Turn it into a bar environment with copious Korean alcohols, beers, and ‘fusion’ choices of sake and wines—definitely Korean as well. Different jeong with drinks would be a more Korean experience. And definitely a noraebang singing room or two that you could eat in as well is Korean. Perhaps the noraebang could be dual or triple use--quickly converting into a cozy and dark ‘DVD bang’/room with ‘Hallyu’ Korean-wave and international DVD rentals for watching while eating jeong and drinking. It could convert once more to serve a private banquet of more elaborate royal cuisine. Remember the Korean bubble-gum pop muzak. And where is that little instant coffee machine at the door?
Help Korea’s small regional farmers and stock raisers, the backbone of cultural and biological diversity maintenance. It’s cultural suicide and biodiversity suicide to keep demoting small-scale farmers’ jobs and economic capacity as both the left and the right in Korea have been doing. The only sane ‘green growth’ is to save your small farmers and clean soils from becoming toxic and pesticide-laden. Only that maintains nutritional quality of Korean foods and public health in the long run. Make Korean vegetables and fruits high quality organic. Make Korean meat a trusted, grass-fed, organic product. It will have positive feedback in Korea itself, encouraging removal of mindboggling levels of antibiotics in Korean meats. It is not healthy for animals, the environment, or consumers of such products since it creates contexts of disease virulence. Take the high road on regulation and introduce testing of all Korean hanoe beef for BSE/mad cow in this lucrative international economy sector. Expand it later to all animals. Stick behind the policy like Japan and the E.U. do. “Korean 100% Organic, Grass-Fed, Hanoe Beef” has a nice ring to it. Don’t source from genetically engineered crops. People globally will fall head over heels to eat trusted Korean animal and plant products. With a larger dispersed global market the prices will go down.
Three Koreans recently died of cyanide food poisoning. That should not happen to the international consumer either. Introduce a special license (or reward/recognition) for raising high quality food for restaurants overseas. This can gradually--by example and market pressures--popularize more consumer-friendly food production practices domestically.
The recent tourism catch phrase “Korea Sparkling” should apply to the quality of Korean food sold overseas primarily. This is because food is typically the first carrier of a cultural experience for most foreigners. If Korean culture is expressed in the food, cultural curiosities and admiration will lure people further into Koreanness (and future markets). Think synergistically and you can help ‘green’ it all: domestic health policy, international image, tourism, environment, and international market food quality all at once.
In conclusion, people miss the point if they think they are selling food. No, sell Korean organization of food and experience. Give people a chance to feel what it is to “eat Korean” and do it safely and you will make a friend (and customer) for life. I’m certainly one.
The writer is a professor of environmental sociology at Ewha Womans University in Seoul, and author of ``Toward a Bioregional State'' (2005) and “Ecological Revolution” (2009). He can be reached at mwhitaker@ewha.ac.kr The views expressed in the above article are those of the author and do not reflect the editorial policy of The Korea Times.
...(no link yet)...
Thursday, May 28, 2009
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
Week 11: Post your Blog Entries as Comments to my Main Post Each Week
Post by Sunday at midnight
1. Mark Whitaker
2. The Rush to "Korean Organic" Could Still Make You Sick--Because Korea lacks Legal Definitions of Organic, Still
3. I was unaware of this. Interesting that there is not a word from President Lee so far on expanding organic health standards as part of his claimed Green New Deal slogan, even though health and untrustworthy food was polled as what was of most concern to Koreans (even above fear of nuclear weapons, etc.) a few months ago.
--------------------
05-19-2009 21:08
Safety of Organic Baby Products Questioned [Because Korea Doesn't Have Any Organic Standards, Legally Speaking]
Organic baby products
By Kim Tong-hyung
Staff Reporter
Organic and natural beauty supplies are the fastest growing segment of the cosmetics market, but consumer rights advocates are now questioning whether these products are really green.
Consumers are more health-conscious than ever and the anger over the recent discovery of talc containing asbestos in baby powders, cosmetics and pharmaceuticals have organic products flying off local shelves.
Lotte Department Store said the sales of its brands, such as Aveda and Origins, have more than doubled from last year's numbers, and Hyundai Department Store is also reporting a significant increase in the sales of similar products.
``Consumers are increasing looking for products verified as organic items, and we really got a lot of inquiries around the talc fiasco,'' said a sales manager at Lotte Department Store's Sogong-dong outlet.
``Brands like Aveda, Kiehl's, L'occitane are becoming popular.''
The growing sales indicate that consumers in general are trusting these organic products to be healthier for their bodies and also for the environment. Obviously, many of them would be appalled to know that the Korea Food and Drug Administration (KFDA) has no answer when asked ``just what is an organic beauty product?''
The country has yet to establish certification standards for companies using the word ``organic'' in brand names, thus failing to control how much of a product is made from organic elements. There also aren't any requirements for companies to display the ``organic percentages'' of their products on packaging.
So, in many cases, a consumer would have no idea whether the lotion they just bought uses 90 percent organic ingredients or less than 1 percent.
And, despite all the claims about cleanness, a wide range of organic beauty supplies, such as shampoos and lotions, were found to contain undesirable substances known to linked with health problems.
A report by Consumers Korea, a Seoul-based civic group, found that seven out of nine organic baby products sold here contain substances that are identified as potential health hazards by American's Environmental Working Group and the European Consumers' Organization (BEUC).
The Nuk Natural Diaper Cream, a popular baby product imported by Boryung Medience, contains polyethylene glycol (PEG) compounds and paraben preservatives, chemicals that are believed to increase the risk of a variety of cancers.
PEG compounds were also found in Boryung's Pureganic Baby Body & Hair Wash and the company's Nuk Classic Face Cream contained levels of benzyl alcohol, which was also found in L'occitane Korea's Mom & Baby Cream and Skinvery Nature Baby Shampoo & Bath and Baby Cream.
And many products branded as ``organic,'' ``natural'' and ``green'' aren't revealing their usage of organic ingredients on their packages, which includes Boryung's Nuk Classic Face Cream and Dr. Atomild Essential Moisture Wash, Yuhan-Kimberly's Green Finger products, and Johnson & Johnson's Soothing Natural baby products.
``Consumers trust organic baby products to be safer than others, but you can argue that such beliefs aren't backed by much logic,'' said Jin Jeong-ran, an official from Consumers Korea.
``The products are taking advantage of consumer fears erupting from the talc fiasco and exploiting the country's lack of regulations in handling organic products.''
thkim@koreatimes.co.kr
---
http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2009/05/123_45211.html
1. Mark Whitaker
2. The Rush to "Korean Organic" Could Still Make You Sick--Because Korea lacks Legal Definitions of Organic, Still
3. I was unaware of this. Interesting that there is not a word from President Lee so far on expanding organic health standards as part of his claimed Green New Deal slogan, even though health and untrustworthy food was polled as what was of most concern to Koreans (even above fear of nuclear weapons, etc.) a few months ago.
--------------------
05-19-2009 21:08
Safety of Organic Baby Products Questioned [Because Korea Doesn't Have Any Organic Standards, Legally Speaking]
Organic baby products
By Kim Tong-hyung
Staff Reporter
Organic and natural beauty supplies are the fastest growing segment of the cosmetics market, but consumer rights advocates are now questioning whether these products are really green.
Consumers are more health-conscious than ever and the anger over the recent discovery of talc containing asbestos in baby powders, cosmetics and pharmaceuticals have organic products flying off local shelves.
Lotte Department Store said the sales of its brands, such as Aveda and Origins, have more than doubled from last year's numbers, and Hyundai Department Store is also reporting a significant increase in the sales of similar products.
``Consumers are increasing looking for products verified as organic items, and we really got a lot of inquiries around the talc fiasco,'' said a sales manager at Lotte Department Store's Sogong-dong outlet.
``Brands like Aveda, Kiehl's, L'occitane are becoming popular.''
The growing sales indicate that consumers in general are trusting these organic products to be healthier for their bodies and also for the environment. Obviously, many of them would be appalled to know that the Korea Food and Drug Administration (KFDA) has no answer when asked ``just what is an organic beauty product?''
The country has yet to establish certification standards for companies using the word ``organic'' in brand names, thus failing to control how much of a product is made from organic elements. There also aren't any requirements for companies to display the ``organic percentages'' of their products on packaging.
So, in many cases, a consumer would have no idea whether the lotion they just bought uses 90 percent organic ingredients or less than 1 percent.
And, despite all the claims about cleanness, a wide range of organic beauty supplies, such as shampoos and lotions, were found to contain undesirable substances known to linked with health problems.
A report by Consumers Korea, a Seoul-based civic group, found that seven out of nine organic baby products sold here contain substances that are identified as potential health hazards by American's Environmental Working Group and the European Consumers' Organization (BEUC).
The Nuk Natural Diaper Cream, a popular baby product imported by Boryung Medience, contains polyethylene glycol (PEG) compounds and paraben preservatives, chemicals that are believed to increase the risk of a variety of cancers.
PEG compounds were also found in Boryung's Pureganic Baby Body & Hair Wash and the company's Nuk Classic Face Cream contained levels of benzyl alcohol, which was also found in L'occitane Korea's Mom & Baby Cream and Skinvery Nature Baby Shampoo & Bath and Baby Cream.
And many products branded as ``organic,'' ``natural'' and ``green'' aren't revealing their usage of organic ingredients on their packages, which includes Boryung's Nuk Classic Face Cream and Dr. Atomild Essential Moisture Wash, Yuhan-Kimberly's Green Finger products, and Johnson & Johnson's Soothing Natural baby products.
``Consumers trust organic baby products to be safer than others, but you can argue that such beliefs aren't backed by much logic,'' said Jin Jeong-ran, an official from Consumers Korea.
``The products are taking advantage of consumer fears erupting from the talc fiasco and exploiting the country's lack of regulations in handling organic products.''
thkim@koreatimes.co.kr
---
http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2009/05/123_45211.html
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
Friday, May 8, 2009
Monday, April 20, 2009
Week 8: Post your Blog Entries as Comments to my Main Post Each Week
Post by Sunday at midnight (by May 3, 2009)
No post in Week 7 (mid-term week).
No post in Week 7 (mid-term week).
Thursday, April 9, 2009
Week 6: Post your Blog Entries as Comments to my Main Post Each Week
Post by Sunday at midnight.
think of the many 'risk society' effects and read the comments: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=crY9fRdrkto&NR=1
1. Mark Whitaker
2. Risk Society, Catastrophe, and the "Relations of Definition" battles in the coal ash flood in the State of Tennessee, Late 2008
3. In late 2008, a coal ash 'flood' behind a weak dam was released catastrophically by weather changes, thawing and unthawing the frozen ground. When the dam collapsed, it released billions of gallons of coal ash suspended in the freezing water. It carried away whole valleys of communities. It has left hundreds of times 'established safety levels' of many heavy metals in the water, the soil, and in the people. It's now working its way through the ecology, down multiple Tennessee Rivers. One-third of all people in a huge area are complaining of sudden breathing problems. Meanwhile, it doesn't exist as a problem despite happening, since the official government scientists deny the data. Note how this is tailor made to demonstrate issues of Beck's view about forms of politics based on distrust of institutions in risk society--when they are seen as covering up their own previously authorized and 'tolerable' risks when these estimations were wildly wrong. The institutions of safety are delegitimated as the legalizers of risk instead.
It additionally shows the "social invisibility" of risk. The whole article is about the social construction of something that clearly happened, though the battle is over the "relations of definition" after the fact in the aftermath. Note the public relations editing that occurred in the institution to hide the original announced cause of the environmental testing--for health and environmental risk. Beck described this as the strange context of following the forms of liability though designed to leave zero blame attached, without any assurances that it won't happen in the future either! These "relations of definition" become core to Beck's view of risk society politics in an era of institutionally-introduced and institutionally-defended catastrophe, or as he called it "organized irresponsibility:" claims of liability despite no fault blame for disasters such as these.
At least so far. How do you calculate durable forms of integenerational damage this will cause? Think about the SCALE of the heavy metals they have found. And think about the same type of waste slurry 'accidentally' (not really, institutionally approved as 'low risk' then happening catastrophically) in the canalized Korean rivers, into Korean agriculture, ecology, etc.--while the government assuredly would downplay or 'question' any scientific danger estimation not of its own invention.
Remember this case when we talk about "Ulsan Disease". This was a social constructed issue of a previously denied ailment in the 1980s. The Korean government and Korean government scientists denied it was an environmental work-related danger. However, it turned out it was. "Ulsan Disease" was a big issue for the 'relations of definition' battles between Korean activists armed with science versus the government armed with its own scientists. This happened in the latter days of the Korean Presidential/dictatorship arrangement before 1987. We'll read about it in the So and Lee reading about South Korean environmentalism in the 1970s-1980s.
----------------------
Tennessee's Dirty Data
Comment
By Kelly Hearn
This article appeared in the April 20, 2009 edition of The Nation.
April 2, 2009
A shorter version of this article appeared in the April 20 issue of The Nation. Research support was provided by the Investigative Fund at The Nation Institute.
The Tennessee Valley Authority manipulated science methods to downplay water contamination caused by a massive coal ash disaster, according to independent technical experts and critics of the federally funded electrical company.
Toxic Coal in Tennessee
Tennessee
Kelly Hearn: A massive coal sludge spill reveals the Tennessee Valley Authority has become a poster child for the failures of self-regulation.
The TVA is the largest public provider of electricity in the nation, providing power to 670,000 homes and burning through some 14,000 tons of coal per day. On December 22 the authority made headlines when one of its [safe] retention ponds collapsed, letting loose an avalanche of coal ash--the toxic residue left over when coal is burned. More than 5 million cubic yards of ashy mud pushed its way through a neighborhood and into Tennessee's Emory River, knocked houses off foundations and blanketed river water with plumes of gray scum that flowed downstream.
New evidence indicates that in the wake of the disaster, the TVA may have intentionally collected water samples from clean spots in the Emory River, a major supplier of drinking water for nearby cities and a popular site for recreational activities such as swimming and fishing. Third-party tests have found high levels of toxins in the river water and in private wells, while the TVA has assured residents that tap water, well water and river water are safe.
Contrary Data
In the days after the spill, the TVA assured the public that the coal ash was "inert material." But soon questions emerged about the chemistry of the ash, particularly the presence of toxic elements like selenium and arsenic. [State/TVA] Scientists said the toxins were dissolving unseen into the Emory, which feeds into two other rivers--the Tennessee and the Clinch--and supplies municipal water treatment plants.
Trust in the authority, a massive local employer and an icon of the Roosevelt administration, has faded. In February an internal TVA memo obtained by the Associated Press showed that the authority was polishing its public statements. In that document, TVA officials changed the description of the disaster from "catastrophic" to "sudden" and "accidental" [no fault, they were their own judge and jury!] and removed the phrases "risk to public health" and "risk to the environment" as reasons for measuring water quality.
At least four lawsuits have been filed since the December spill, and a federal judge has ordered the authority not to destroy any documents. Meanwhile, a recent survey by Tennessee's state health department said that one third of the residents living near the spill are reporting breathing problems.
Many residents question government claims that water treatment facilities will effectively filter tap water for toxins such as arsenic and selenium. They also voice deep concerns about a longer list of toxins swirling in untreated river water and those appearing, according to private water samples, in private drinking wells. Some residents have complained of a gray film in their tap water and of a burning sensation on their skin and in their eyes after taking a shower.
Officials have consistently maintained that the drinking water is safe. On December 23 the [federal] Environmental Protection Agency tested water near a municipal drinking water treatment plant and found arsenic 149 times higher than that allowed by federal drinking water standards. Yet in a public notice the agency said the heavy metal, which is linked to cancer, would "likely" be filtered out by municipal water treatment.
Days later, with outrage and litigation mounting, a TVA environmental officer, Neil Carriker, told reporters that the gray goo in the river was made up of unsightly but harmless microscopic spheres of glass called cenospheres, which float in plumes downriver. In a December press conference, he assured the public that the river water and drinking water were safe, points consistently reiterated by the TVA.
But technical experts cite persistent, stark differences between water quality reported by independent parties and the reassuring reports offered by state and federal authorities.
Early in the disaster, for example, on January 9, the environmental group Appalachian Voices, working with a biology professor at Appalachian State University, took water samples from the Emory, Clinch and Tennessee Rivers, in which they found arsenic levels 300 times higher than the drinking water standard. The group documented wide differences between official TVA data and data collected by the group and other watchdog organizations.
The TVA later reported data showing arsenic levels to be twenty times lower than safe standards.
A little earlier, on December 30, two other environmental organizations--the Tennessee-based United Mountain Defense and the Environmental Integrity Project (EIP), a Washington, DC, group founded by a former EPA regulator--found arsenic in local river water to be eight times higher than safe levels. At another point, a Duke University test of standing water in a tributary of the Emory River showed arsenic was nine times higher than safe standards. Again, TVA tests were the only outliers. The authority's subsequent tests on January 14 found arsenic levels to be forty times lower than safe drinking water standards.
[regional local subpolitics] EIP and United Mountain Defense reported the results of further tests in February, which showed that water quality criteria for arsenic, lead, selenium, cadmium and copper had all been violated and that drinking water standards had been exceeded not only for arsenic but also for antimony, beryllium and lead--which are toxic [deadly] at certain doses.
Experts say that, given the dynamics of river flow and contamination, test results will often vary, sometimes greatly. "You expect to find fluctuations," said Jeff Stant, a trained biologist and EIP official. "What's troubling is that TVA's data is suspiciously consistent." Gregory Button, an anthropology professor at the University of Tennessee, shares Stant's concern. "In disaster situations like this, science is always a point of contention," he said. "But the difference is so large in this case that there's no trust."
When asked about early reports showing water quality differences, TVA spokesperson Barbara Martocci, speaking during a December interview with The Nation, chose not to comment on the data, saying only that the TVA uses EPA-certified laboratories. (Data reported by EIP and United Mountain Defense also came from EPA-certified labs.) The TVA is "eager to review the findings of any reports or studies that might show differences between TVA's water quality reports, and we will take those reports seriously," said TVA spokesperson Gil Francis. "I don't understand why [sic] the TVA, the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation and the EPA aren't finding the same problems as these private groups," Francis added.
Fixing the Results?
Chris Irwin, a lawyer with United Mountain Defense, said, "The gap between our data and theirs strongly suggests that the TVA has practiced selective testing." He pointed out that the cenospheres tell the naked eye where the chemical contamination is. "If you want to test clean," he said, "then you simply go to the side where the plume isn't." Charles Norris, the senior geochemist with the Colorado-based environmental geology firm Geo-Hydro, said that Tennessee's state-approved program for representing river water quality "has demonstrably been unable to account for the variability that's being picked up by third-party sampling."
In recent weeks, an inquiry in conjunction with The Nation Institute's Investigative Fund uncovered satellite positioning locations for the authority's water sampling stations inside a TVA dredging permit application. The data were pinpointed on aerial maps and shown to independent experts in an effort to determine whether the TVA skewed its choice of water sample sites.
Donna Lisenby, a river monitor for Appalachian Voices, said the location data gave critics a smoking gun. "You can skew the data by putting testing points in odd locations, such as behind a sandbar or far upriver away from the spill," she said. "The GPS locations show that that is what the TVA has been doing." Bob Gadinski, a former hydrologist for the State of Pennsylvania, said that the TVA's use of only five testing locations was "too few." He said the agency planned to test at a single depth for each location rather than at multiple depths and pointed out that at least three locations were placed at points in the river where contamination was less likely to reach (for example, one sample location should have been in the main channel of the river and was instead placed near the bank). After reviewing the GPS data, Gadinski concluded that "the TVA isn't interested in properly mapping the contaminants in that river."
Representatives from EIP and United Mountain Defense, as well as a biology professor at Appalachian State University, all viewed the site locations; all agreed the locations were "intentionally biased for nonsignificance" in ways that would not give a true reading of the contamination map.
In addition, Norris said the river monitoring programs of independent groups are "better programmed" to find and map contamination than the authority's testing program. According to Stant, "They either didn't know that this testing scheme was poorly designed, or they knew and didn't care."
[Organized irresponsibility, going through what are now empty motions of rationality, with interests to cover up and don a mantle of science in a process of legitimating state institutions despite them being the ones that contributed to the disaster.]
At a March 5 community meeting, state and federal officials again reiterated that government testing shows air and water near the site to be safe. Meanwhile, Rick Cantrell, a member of Tennessee Coal Ash Survivors, an advocacy organization formed in the wake of the disaster, told the Associated Press that his group's water quality data has "either been disregarded or just brushed off by TVA."
Button shares Cantrell's assessment. TVA officials, he said, "make these global statements and avoid having to answer real questions about the data discrepancies." At the minimum, he said, the authority should be more forthcoming about its science protocols.
Further Health Risks
Another issue raises concerns: the TVA's claim that cenospheres are inert. A study conducted in the 1970s by Alex Gabbard, now a retired scientist at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, seems to show that the TVA misrepresented what is known about these particles. "It's true that cenospheres by themselves are harmless," said Gabbard, but his research determined that metals including uranium bind to the otherwise benign cenospheres, potentially turning them into a vector for [bioaccumulative] toxins.
"A main question, is," he said in an interview with The Nation, "What about all the other stuff in the ash?"
A cloud also hovers over the TVA's approach to well water sampling. By February 3 TDEC had sampled more than 100 private groundwater wells within a four-mile radius of the plant, announcing that all sample results were within safe drinking water standards. But, again, critics suggest the data lacked credibility.
"Our data showed all kinds of heavy metals in private wells," said Jeff Stant of the EIP. "I don't understand how official data can show otherwise." Stant told The Nation that while his team was not able to test wells at the spill site because they had been sealed off by the TVA, [that tested them without competition!] the wells EIP tested showed high levels of sodium, which poses a risk for people with heart problems, as well as the metals aluminum and manganese.
TDEC has issued an enforcement order against the TVA for violating water quality standards that protect aquatic wildlife, but an agency spokesperson said that "results to date have not indicated exceedances of the primary drinking standards for metals."
---
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090420/hearn
So what are you going to do in the risk society?
Video of this normal disaster:
TVA Coal Ash Spill Emory River Tennessee
Sandra Diaz, National Field Coordinator for Appalachian Voices, Hurricane Creekeeper John Wathen and Watauga Riverkeeper Donna Lisenby paddle up the Clinch and Emory Rivers to record the conditions after a 5.4 million cubic yard spill of coal waste from the Tennessee Valley Authority's Kingston Coal Plant.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ats3dClc0No
1:17 min
Tenn.'s Toxic Sludge Spill, CBS News, Water for Millions in Tennessee Now Endangered, Five Miles from the main river
The Tenn. Valley Authority is working to contain [are they?] a spill of 2.6 million cubic yards of potentially toxic pollutants after a breach at a local power plant.
1:49 min
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wtJVSwdfEZ0&feature=related
[has a nice graphic map to get an overview of what is at stake when potentially hundreds of times above safety levels of many toxic metals get into the main Tennessee River now.]
Aerial Footage of Retaining Wall Failure (Footage from TVA website)
A retaining wall holding 80 acres of flyash failed at the Tennessee Valley Authority's Kingston coal-fired power plant early monday morning. 2.6 million cubic yards of fly ash were released and covered 250 to 400 acres with four to six feet of ash. Eleven homes were damaged and evacuated. Thankfully, no injuries or fatalities were reported.
7 min
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hYGO7O30moM&feature=related
think of the many 'risk society' effects and read the comments: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=crY9fRdrkto&NR=1
1. Mark Whitaker
2. Risk Society, Catastrophe, and the "Relations of Definition" battles in the coal ash flood in the State of Tennessee, Late 2008
3. In late 2008, a coal ash 'flood' behind a weak dam was released catastrophically by weather changes, thawing and unthawing the frozen ground. When the dam collapsed, it released billions of gallons of coal ash suspended in the freezing water. It carried away whole valleys of communities. It has left hundreds of times 'established safety levels' of many heavy metals in the water, the soil, and in the people. It's now working its way through the ecology, down multiple Tennessee Rivers. One-third of all people in a huge area are complaining of sudden breathing problems. Meanwhile, it doesn't exist as a problem despite happening, since the official government scientists deny the data. Note how this is tailor made to demonstrate issues of Beck's view about forms of politics based on distrust of institutions in risk society--when they are seen as covering up their own previously authorized and 'tolerable' risks when these estimations were wildly wrong. The institutions of safety are delegitimated as the legalizers of risk instead.
It additionally shows the "social invisibility" of risk. The whole article is about the social construction of something that clearly happened, though the battle is over the "relations of definition" after the fact in the aftermath. Note the public relations editing that occurred in the institution to hide the original announced cause of the environmental testing--for health and environmental risk. Beck described this as the strange context of following the forms of liability though designed to leave zero blame attached, without any assurances that it won't happen in the future either! These "relations of definition" become core to Beck's view of risk society politics in an era of institutionally-introduced and institutionally-defended catastrophe, or as he called it "organized irresponsibility:" claims of liability despite no fault blame for disasters such as these.
At least so far. How do you calculate durable forms of integenerational damage this will cause? Think about the SCALE of the heavy metals they have found. And think about the same type of waste slurry 'accidentally' (not really, institutionally approved as 'low risk' then happening catastrophically) in the canalized Korean rivers, into Korean agriculture, ecology, etc.--while the government assuredly would downplay or 'question' any scientific danger estimation not of its own invention.
Remember this case when we talk about "Ulsan Disease". This was a social constructed issue of a previously denied ailment in the 1980s. The Korean government and Korean government scientists denied it was an environmental work-related danger. However, it turned out it was. "Ulsan Disease" was a big issue for the 'relations of definition' battles between Korean activists armed with science versus the government armed with its own scientists. This happened in the latter days of the Korean Presidential/dictatorship arrangement before 1987. We'll read about it in the So and Lee reading about South Korean environmentalism in the 1970s-1980s.
----------------------
Tennessee's Dirty Data
Comment
By Kelly Hearn
This article appeared in the April 20, 2009 edition of The Nation.
April 2, 2009
A shorter version of this article appeared in the April 20 issue of The Nation. Research support was provided by the Investigative Fund at The Nation Institute.
The Tennessee Valley Authority manipulated science methods to downplay water contamination caused by a massive coal ash disaster, according to independent technical experts and critics of the federally funded electrical company.
Toxic Coal in Tennessee
Tennessee
Kelly Hearn: A massive coal sludge spill reveals the Tennessee Valley Authority has become a poster child for the failures of self-regulation.
The TVA is the largest public provider of electricity in the nation, providing power to 670,000 homes and burning through some 14,000 tons of coal per day. On December 22 the authority made headlines when one of its [safe] retention ponds collapsed, letting loose an avalanche of coal ash--the toxic residue left over when coal is burned. More than 5 million cubic yards of ashy mud pushed its way through a neighborhood and into Tennessee's Emory River, knocked houses off foundations and blanketed river water with plumes of gray scum that flowed downstream.
New evidence indicates that in the wake of the disaster, the TVA may have intentionally collected water samples from clean spots in the Emory River, a major supplier of drinking water for nearby cities and a popular site for recreational activities such as swimming and fishing. Third-party tests have found high levels of toxins in the river water and in private wells, while the TVA has assured residents that tap water, well water and river water are safe.
Contrary Data
In the days after the spill, the TVA assured the public that the coal ash was "inert material." But soon questions emerged about the chemistry of the ash, particularly the presence of toxic elements like selenium and arsenic. [State/TVA] Scientists said the toxins were dissolving unseen into the Emory, which feeds into two other rivers--the Tennessee and the Clinch--and supplies municipal water treatment plants.
Trust in the authority, a massive local employer and an icon of the Roosevelt administration, has faded. In February an internal TVA memo obtained by the Associated Press showed that the authority was polishing its public statements. In that document, TVA officials changed the description of the disaster from "catastrophic" to "sudden" and "accidental" [no fault, they were their own judge and jury!] and removed the phrases "risk to public health" and "risk to the environment" as reasons for measuring water quality.
At least four lawsuits have been filed since the December spill, and a federal judge has ordered the authority not to destroy any documents. Meanwhile, a recent survey by Tennessee's state health department said that one third of the residents living near the spill are reporting breathing problems.
Many residents question government claims that water treatment facilities will effectively filter tap water for toxins such as arsenic and selenium. They also voice deep concerns about a longer list of toxins swirling in untreated river water and those appearing, according to private water samples, in private drinking wells. Some residents have complained of a gray film in their tap water and of a burning sensation on their skin and in their eyes after taking a shower.
Officials have consistently maintained that the drinking water is safe. On December 23 the [federal] Environmental Protection Agency tested water near a municipal drinking water treatment plant and found arsenic 149 times higher than that allowed by federal drinking water standards. Yet in a public notice the agency said the heavy metal, which is linked to cancer, would "likely" be filtered out by municipal water treatment.
Days later, with outrage and litigation mounting, a TVA environmental officer, Neil Carriker, told reporters that the gray goo in the river was made up of unsightly but harmless microscopic spheres of glass called cenospheres, which float in plumes downriver. In a December press conference, he assured the public that the river water and drinking water were safe, points consistently reiterated by the TVA.
But technical experts cite persistent, stark differences between water quality reported by independent parties and the reassuring reports offered by state and federal authorities.
Early in the disaster, for example, on January 9, the environmental group Appalachian Voices, working with a biology professor at Appalachian State University, took water samples from the Emory, Clinch and Tennessee Rivers, in which they found arsenic levels 300 times higher than the drinking water standard. The group documented wide differences between official TVA data and data collected by the group and other watchdog organizations.
The TVA later reported data showing arsenic levels to be twenty times lower than safe standards.
A little earlier, on December 30, two other environmental organizations--the Tennessee-based United Mountain Defense and the Environmental Integrity Project (EIP), a Washington, DC, group founded by a former EPA regulator--found arsenic in local river water to be eight times higher than safe levels. At another point, a Duke University test of standing water in a tributary of the Emory River showed arsenic was nine times higher than safe standards. Again, TVA tests were the only outliers. The authority's subsequent tests on January 14 found arsenic levels to be forty times lower than safe drinking water standards.
[regional local subpolitics] EIP and United Mountain Defense reported the results of further tests in February, which showed that water quality criteria for arsenic, lead, selenium, cadmium and copper had all been violated and that drinking water standards had been exceeded not only for arsenic but also for antimony, beryllium and lead--which are toxic [deadly] at certain doses.
Experts say that, given the dynamics of river flow and contamination, test results will often vary, sometimes greatly. "You expect to find fluctuations," said Jeff Stant, a trained biologist and EIP official. "What's troubling is that TVA's data is suspiciously consistent." Gregory Button, an anthropology professor at the University of Tennessee, shares Stant's concern. "In disaster situations like this, science is always a point of contention," he said. "But the difference is so large in this case that there's no trust."
When asked about early reports showing water quality differences, TVA spokesperson Barbara Martocci, speaking during a December interview with The Nation, chose not to comment on the data, saying only that the TVA uses EPA-certified laboratories. (Data reported by EIP and United Mountain Defense also came from EPA-certified labs.) The TVA is "eager to review the findings of any reports or studies that might show differences between TVA's water quality reports, and we will take those reports seriously," said TVA spokesperson Gil Francis. "I don't understand why [sic] the TVA, the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation and the EPA aren't finding the same problems as these private groups," Francis added.
Fixing the Results?
Chris Irwin, a lawyer with United Mountain Defense, said, "The gap between our data and theirs strongly suggests that the TVA has practiced selective testing." He pointed out that the cenospheres tell the naked eye where the chemical contamination is. "If you want to test clean," he said, "then you simply go to the side where the plume isn't." Charles Norris, the senior geochemist with the Colorado-based environmental geology firm Geo-Hydro, said that Tennessee's state-approved program for representing river water quality "has demonstrably been unable to account for the variability that's being picked up by third-party sampling."
In recent weeks, an inquiry in conjunction with The Nation Institute's Investigative Fund uncovered satellite positioning locations for the authority's water sampling stations inside a TVA dredging permit application. The data were pinpointed on aerial maps and shown to independent experts in an effort to determine whether the TVA skewed its choice of water sample sites.
Donna Lisenby, a river monitor for Appalachian Voices, said the location data gave critics a smoking gun. "You can skew the data by putting testing points in odd locations, such as behind a sandbar or far upriver away from the spill," she said. "The GPS locations show that that is what the TVA has been doing." Bob Gadinski, a former hydrologist for the State of Pennsylvania, said that the TVA's use of only five testing locations was "too few." He said the agency planned to test at a single depth for each location rather than at multiple depths and pointed out that at least three locations were placed at points in the river where contamination was less likely to reach (for example, one sample location should have been in the main channel of the river and was instead placed near the bank). After reviewing the GPS data, Gadinski concluded that "the TVA isn't interested in properly mapping the contaminants in that river."
Representatives from EIP and United Mountain Defense, as well as a biology professor at Appalachian State University, all viewed the site locations; all agreed the locations were "intentionally biased for nonsignificance" in ways that would not give a true reading of the contamination map.
In addition, Norris said the river monitoring programs of independent groups are "better programmed" to find and map contamination than the authority's testing program. According to Stant, "They either didn't know that this testing scheme was poorly designed, or they knew and didn't care."
[Organized irresponsibility, going through what are now empty motions of rationality, with interests to cover up and don a mantle of science in a process of legitimating state institutions despite them being the ones that contributed to the disaster.]
At a March 5 community meeting, state and federal officials again reiterated that government testing shows air and water near the site to be safe. Meanwhile, Rick Cantrell, a member of Tennessee Coal Ash Survivors, an advocacy organization formed in the wake of the disaster, told the Associated Press that his group's water quality data has "either been disregarded or just brushed off by TVA."
Button shares Cantrell's assessment. TVA officials, he said, "make these global statements and avoid having to answer real questions about the data discrepancies." At the minimum, he said, the authority should be more forthcoming about its science protocols.
Further Health Risks
Another issue raises concerns: the TVA's claim that cenospheres are inert. A study conducted in the 1970s by Alex Gabbard, now a retired scientist at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, seems to show that the TVA misrepresented what is known about these particles. "It's true that cenospheres by themselves are harmless," said Gabbard, but his research determined that metals including uranium bind to the otherwise benign cenospheres, potentially turning them into a vector for [bioaccumulative] toxins.
"A main question, is," he said in an interview with The Nation, "What about all the other stuff in the ash?"
A cloud also hovers over the TVA's approach to well water sampling. By February 3 TDEC had sampled more than 100 private groundwater wells within a four-mile radius of the plant, announcing that all sample results were within safe drinking water standards. But, again, critics suggest the data lacked credibility.
"Our data showed all kinds of heavy metals in private wells," said Jeff Stant of the EIP. "I don't understand how official data can show otherwise." Stant told The Nation that while his team was not able to test wells at the spill site because they had been sealed off by the TVA, [that tested them without competition!] the wells EIP tested showed high levels of sodium, which poses a risk for people with heart problems, as well as the metals aluminum and manganese.
TDEC has issued an enforcement order against the TVA for violating water quality standards that protect aquatic wildlife, but an agency spokesperson said that "results to date have not indicated exceedances of the primary drinking standards for metals."
---
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090420/hearn
So what are you going to do in the risk society?
Video of this normal disaster:
TVA Coal Ash Spill Emory River Tennessee
Sandra Diaz, National Field Coordinator for Appalachian Voices, Hurricane Creekeeper John Wathen and Watauga Riverkeeper Donna Lisenby paddle up the Clinch and Emory Rivers to record the conditions after a 5.4 million cubic yard spill of coal waste from the Tennessee Valley Authority's Kingston Coal Plant.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ats3dClc0No
1:17 min
Tenn.'s Toxic Sludge Spill, CBS News, Water for Millions in Tennessee Now Endangered, Five Miles from the main river
The Tenn. Valley Authority is working to contain [are they?] a spill of 2.6 million cubic yards of potentially toxic pollutants after a breach at a local power plant.
1:49 min
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wtJVSwdfEZ0&feature=related
[has a nice graphic map to get an overview of what is at stake when potentially hundreds of times above safety levels of many toxic metals get into the main Tennessee River now.]
Aerial Footage of Retaining Wall Failure (Footage from TVA website)
A retaining wall holding 80 acres of flyash failed at the Tennessee Valley Authority's Kingston coal-fired power plant early monday morning. 2.6 million cubic yards of fly ash were released and covered 250 to 400 acres with four to six feet of ash. Eleven homes were damaged and evacuated. Thankfully, no injuries or fatalities were reported.
7 min
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hYGO7O30moM&feature=related
Saturday, April 4, 2009
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